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A. Introduction, Central Concepts and Analytical Approaches 
1. Introduction and Learning Objectives 
Induced by an upsurge in global demand for mineral and fossil fuels as well as agricultural 
commodities, investments in extractive industries have grown significantly in the last two 
decades in Latin America (Bridge 2004). All over the continent, this increase in extractive 
projects has caused a rise in social conflicts (Hoogenboom 2012; Bebbington 2012a; 
Bebbington / Bury 2013). Indeed, conflicts over how to use natural resources are among the 
most visible social conflicts in current Latin America. 
These conflicts have profoundly shaped the face of many resource-dependent countries in the 
region (and continue to do so). They (and their consequences) have a deep impact on peoples’ 
daily lives as well as on their future well-being: they can generate situations of violent 
confrontations (among people in the local community, with companies or with the state) or they 
can severely damage social cohesion and trust and thereby impede social and economic 
stability. On the other hand, social conflicts can produce positive social or political changes, 
for instance they may lead to processes of institutional innovation that ultimately improve 
peoples’ situations. 
This course offers insights into the dynamics and outcomes of current social conflicts over 
extractivism in Latin America (particularly in the Andean region). It is structured as follows: 
Firstly, it will present some conceptual and theoretical insights related to the study of social 
conflicts in general and conflicts over nature in particular. Then it will proceed to an analysis of 
current conflicts over extractivism in Latin America: the different types, causes, processes of 
mobilization and organization-building, structural factors that shape them and outcomes. Each 
session contains recommendations for preparatory reading. All other references can be found 
in the general biography at the end of the document.  
The learning objectives of this course are as follows: 
• Students will become familiar with and understand concepts and theories which can be 
used to study social conflicts over extractivism 
• Students will learn how to use different analytical tools in order to investigate and 
analyze current conflicts over extractivism in Latin America 
• In particular, students will become familiar with the political ecology framework and the 
contentious politics framework 
• Students will become familiar with the causes and different aspects/dimensions of 
social contention over extractivism 
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• Students will learn about several empirical cases of social contention over extractivism 
in Latin America 
• Students will engage with the theoretical insights produced by several empirical studies 
on the topic and on the region 





2. Concepts and Analytical Approaches 
This section will introduce two analytical approaches that can be used to analyze social 
conflicts over extractivism: the political ecology and the contentious politics frameworks. While 
studies conducted in the framework of political ecology focus on the underlying causes of 
conflicts over nature, the contentious politics framework concentrates on the dynamics of 
political conflicts and their outcomes. Before explaining these frameworks, we will define what 
“conflict” means in this context. Similarly, because states are central actors in many socio-
political conflicts concerning nature, it is also important to understand “the state” means in this 
context and what drives its actions in these social conflicts. 
 
2.1. What is conflict? 
The term “conflict” is often used and seldom specified (both in the academic literature as well 
as in its daily use). Consequently, people may mean very different things when speaking of 
conflicts. On the other hand, because conflicts are evident in any society, the concept would 
seem on its face not to require any further explanation.  
In our understanding, conflict can be viewed as a social action emanating from a relationship 
between at least two individuals or collective actors who perceive that they have contradictory 
interests, goals or needs. Conflicts, in turn, are structured through power and interests. The 
categories of “power” and “interests” serve not only to designate  concepts, but also to connect 
conflicts over resources back to social relationships (such as gender and class relationships, 
race and/or ethnicity based exclusion and refusal of access) which give rise to the conditions 
that shape these conflicts. Thus, an analytical bridge can be built between conflicts as social 
action and structural conditions (Dietz / Engels 2017).  
An existing social relationship does not necessarily require those involved in a conflict to know 
each other personally: few participants in protest movements personally know the people in 
leadership positions of a multinational company that holds the concessions for gold exploration 
and exploitation and demand use of the areas - and vice-versa. Contradictory interests, goals 
and needs are not only features of specific contentious situations but are deeply embedded in 
overarching social structures (gender and class relations, international divisions of labor, 
unequal distribution of access to land, etc.), which are inherent to the social world and form 
the social framework for all social action, including conflict. Conflicts are social acts, but they 
should be understood as always embedded in overarching (social and political) structures. 
These structures form the context in which social conflicts may take place, but as such they 
still do not constitute specific or necessary conflicts. It is only when these social contradictions 
are perceived, interpreted and assessed by social actors (for example, as being unjust or as a 
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threat to their existence), that they become significant and thus lead to social action (Moore 
1978). If actors translate these contradictory social relationships and the perception thereof 
into action, then a conflict exists that we can observe and analyze. 
However, not every structural inconsistency or collective or personal grievances perceived by 
an actor or actors will result in social action. Due to asymmetrical power relations, actors may 
not have the means available for open contestation. Thus, a conflict only exists if a certain 
sequence of actions between actors can be observed. The sequence and nature of these 
actions can take very different forms, depending on the strategies, tactics and the resources 
available to actors. 
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Dietz, K. / Engels, B. (2017): Contested Extractivism: Actors and Strategies in Conflicts 
over Mining. DIE ERDE, 148 (2-3), 111-120. 
 
2.2. What is the State? 
Over time, different dominant conceptualizations about the state and its transformations have 
emerged within the social sciences. During the 1950s and 1960s the dominant theories 
analytically ignored state agency (action by states independent of society) as a driver of 
political processes and social change. They understood states to be rather a direct expression 
of power relations in society. In Marxist theory for instance the state was indicated as “an 
instrument of exploitation of wage labour” (Engels 2010 [1884]: 210) and therefore as a vehicle 
for the bourgeois to maintain their power over the proletariat.  
By contrast, pluralist theories did not perceive states to be simply an instrument of the powerful, 
but as a neutral playing field in which conflicting interests were discussed and bargained until 
participants reached a compromise which would reflect the proportional strength of the 
conflicting positions (Dahl 1961).  
On the other hand, modernization theorists viewed the state as a neutral bureaucratic tool that 
would help to foster processes of industrialization and democratization in the so-called 
underdeveloped countries (Lipset 1960; Bell 1962). Behavioralist scholars put the emphasis 
on decisions and attitudes of individual citizens and their impact on states and the quality of 
governance (Almond / Verba 1965). All these approaches conceptualized states as 
homogenous and unitary objects whose actions were determined by external actors and 
interests. Along these lines, neorealism, the predominant school of thought within the field of 
international relations, understood the state as a black box whose international relations were 
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determined by the position of that state in comparison to other states in the international system 
(Waltz 1959).  
During the 1970s and 1980s, the social sciences left behind the idea of an objective state and 
began to emphasize state agency instead. Nicos Poulantzas (1973) challenged the idea of 
states as neutral objects of class interests from a Neo-Marxist perspective. Poulantzas argued 
that the state was not the mere reflection of the complex structural interactions but "exhibits an 
opacity and resistance of its own" (1978: 130), meaning that it was not a neutral agent, set out 
only to mediate between conflicting interests. It was rather a contested field of power relations, 
in which the capacity to influence state actions is very unevenly spread among different interest 
groups. Furthermore, he argued that the state strategically selects and favors the interests of 
particular hegemonic classes through their domination of specific state branches and through 
the preservation of capitalist forms of ownership and appropriation (Poulantzas 1978: 137). 
But this hegemonic position of specific influential class fractions is not constantly fixed but 
indeed also contested by subordinated groups that try to change social power relations to their 
benefit. Hence the state is a contested terrain in which different groups and classes pursue 
hegemony.  
On the other hand, Maynz and Scharpf (1975) investigated the conditions of successful political 
and social state intervention, while Charles Tilly (1975) and Stein Rokkan (1970) published 
comprehensive studies about modern state formation in Western Europe. These debates 
resulted in the formulation of a theoretical approach termed “historical institutionalism” which 
focuses on the capacity of the state to regulate social and economic processes that have been 
developed over a long period of time. Hence, states were perceived as significantly shaping 
their societies through the accumulation of practices over time, not just on behalf of one group 
or as a neutral mediator among multiple contenders. 
However, it proved difficult to demonstrate that states are in fact homogenous actors with 
clearly defined collective interests. Therefore, Migdal and Schlichte distinguish between 
“seeing” the state (the image people have of the state as a coherent, unitary actor) and “doing” 
the state which involves the diverse, multiple actions of state actors as well as the myriad 
responses and interactions with state officials of non-state actors. These authors propose a 
definition of the state as “a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped 
by 1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation 
of the people bounded by that territory, and 2) the actual practices involving those staffing its 
multiple parts and those they engage in their roles as state officials.” (Migdal / Schlichte 2005: 
15). Also Bebbington et al. (2015) stress the rather incoherent structure of states and their 
institutions which they see as constituting a complex fabric that combines structural features 
with multiple (collective and individual) agencies. Regarding the first, states can be understood 
in terms of the laws and rules executed through bureaucratic processes. All of these “exist as 
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a palimpsest of institutions and organizational forms created by different governing coalitions 
at different points in time […] It is therefore more than likely that the institutions of the state will 
pull in different directions in any one point in time” (Bebbington et al., 2015: 6).  
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Migdal, J. / Schlichte, K. (2005): Rethinking the State, in: Schlichte, K. (ed.): The 
Dynamics of States. The Formation and Crises of State Domination. Abingdon: 
Routledge, 1-40. 
 
2.3. Political Ecology  
Political ecology can best be understood as a cross-disciplinary “field of research”, which asks 
how social power relations, such as class, gender, ‘race’, ethnicity, mediate knowledge about, 
access to, and control over natural resources. It has been nourished by various critical theories, 
disciplines and strands of research (Peet / Watts 2004; Robbins 2004; Leff 2006; Dietz 2014; 
Perreault et al. 2015). 
Political ecologists ask how knowledge about, access to and control over natural resources is 
mediated by social hierarchies and relations of difference based on power relations. Over the 
years, the field has experienced a series of productive differentiations. The most prominent 
approaches that have evolved since the 1970s are neo-Marxian, feminist, post-structural, and 
post-colonial approaches to political ecology. 
 
2.3.1. Different Approaches of Political Ecology 
A neo-Marxian approach in Political Ecology conceptualizes nature and social inequality in 
political economic terms, as grounded in the social relations of capitalist production, 
distribution, and the international division of labor (Blaikie / Brookfield 1987). David Harvey’s 
analytical lexicon on the concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 2003) is often 
used to locate place-based struggles around the commodification of nature within the wider 
scope of recent transformations of global capitalism (Fairhead et al. 2012). In the 1990s a 
feminist Political Ecology gained currency and aimed to bridge both the initial gender gap in 
political economy narratives and to counter the gendered binary codifications that link nature 
and emotions to femininity, but culture and reason to masculinity (Plumwood 1993). One key 
question it asks: is there a gender dimension to the struggles over “knowledge, power and 
practice, (...) politics, justice and governance” (Watts 2000: 257) that are related to 
environmental issues? Recent poststructuralist and performative approaches to feminist theory 
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have explored how gender and gendered subjectivities are constituted alongside other 
identities and markers of difference (class, ‘race’, ethnicity) through the material interaction 
with and symbolic understandings of nature and changes in the environment (Nightingale 
2011; Elmhirst 2011). Parallel with the emergence of a feminist political ecology, a 
poststructuralist political ecology had gained momentum. Analyses focus on the micro-
dynamics of socio-nature transformation, as well as everyday resistance, subject constructions 
and different cultural and discursive articulations, practices and meanings. Scholars ask how 
certain ideas and knowledge about nature, ecology, society and political economy shape the 
way people and societies perceive and use nature and how this perception shapes 
subjectivities and power positions, or forms of eco-governmentality (Escobar 1996, 2008). 
Latin American political ecology attempts to sharply question the Western concepts of 
modernity and development. It challenges Western epistemology by claiming strong 
continuities of global coloniality which are inscribed into societal relationships to nature and 
still suppress and exclude subordinate cultures and knowledges. The Latin American 
perspective is characterized by a “historical and political understanding of the power and 
knowledge relations that regulate the processes of social-ecological appropriation and 
reproduction” (Martin 2013; Alimonda 2011; Alimonda et al. 2017; Leff 2006; Ulloa 2015). 
Hence, the focus of scholars in the tradition of Hector Alimonda, Enrique Leff and Arturo 
Escobar lies on subalternized knowledges that potentially could become the sites, where 
alternative de-colonial projects can develop. 
 
2.3.2. Studying Conflicts through the Lenses of Political Ecology 
Political ecology approaches claim that nature and society are mutually interlinked and 
constantly reproducing each other. The environment is not perceived as an object of human 
agency but as an arena of contested entitlements and cultural meanings related to nature that 
can vary to a large extent from one region to another (Martinez-Alier 2004: 8; Escobar 2006). 
Therefore, the focus of analysis lies on historic developments and power relations that evolved 
over centuries and influenced the emergence of conflicts. From a political ecological 
perspective, social power relations are inscribed into nature through transformative material 
practices and symbolic representations. Transformative material practices involve all actions 
performed by humans to appropriate and modify nature in order to fulfill their own needs. 
Symbolic representations include social categories as class, gender, and ethnicity which are 
inscribed into nature through uneven distribution and access to resources. Therefore 
environmental conflicts are understood as social, economic, political and cultural conflicts at 
the same time. Conflicts over resources do seldom occur because of environmental properties 
such as chemical and mineral composition of resources. Resource conflicts usually emerge 
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because social power relations find their expression in the way that entitlement and access to, 
control over and distribution of resources is regulated. The effects of humans’ transformative 
material practices on the other hand unfold impacts which in turn influence social actions and 
institutions. One example is the development of new genetic engineering technologies which 
would be impossible without the extraction of natural resources. It contains the possibility for 
multinational corporations to patent particular DNA sequences of seeds that were formerly 
used and spread among indigenous people in the global South. This essentially modifies not 
only the global regulation of intellectual property rights but also the access to seeds for 
indigenous peoples. The consequences can reach from threats to food safety and land 
conflicts to legal proceedings between intellectual property institutions and multinational 
companies. To analyze conflict from a political ecological perspective means to ask the 
following questions: What do different social actors do in relation to nature? How do they 
perceive and interpret environmental change? How do environmental conditions change and 
transform social actions and institutions? What are the power sources of different actors and 
how do social categories mediate environmental conflicts? 
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Perreault, T. / Bridge, G. / McCarthy, J. (Eds., 2015): The Routledge Handbook of 
Political Ecology. London: Routledge (Part I: Introduction) 
 
2.4. Contentious Politics 
While the political ecology approach analyzes the relationship between social relations 
(defined by power positions) and nature and in this way uncovers the social and political 
causes of many conflicts (over nature), the contentious politics approach aims at 
understanding dynamics and outcomes of conflicts in general.  
The approach or framework was developed by the US American scholars Douglas McAdam, 
Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001) with the aim of broadening the field of research (so far 
limited to European and North American social movements), both concerning the subject of 
analysis as well as the theoretical and methodological approaches.  
The term “contentious politics” is defined as “episodic, public, collective interaction among 
makers of claims and their objects, when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object 
of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at 
least one of the claimants.” (McAdam / Tarrow / Tilly 2001: 5). Hence, contentious politics 
combine three main elements: Contention, understood as “making claims that bear on 
someone else’s interests,” collective action as denoting the “coordinating efforts on behalf of 
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shared interests and programs,” and politics as a realm of interaction in which at least one of 
the actors is an agent of governments (Tilly / Tarrow 2006: 4-5). Those making claims are 
termed “challengers” in the framework´s conceptual language. 
“Contentious politics” constitutes a broad concept able to integrate various empirical 
specifications, such as rebellions, war, terrorism, riots, spontaneous protest actions and social 
movements. The latter constitute but one form of contentious politics defined as “sustained 
challenges to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those 
power holders by means of concerted public displays of that population’s worthiness, unity, 
numbers, and commitment “WUNC”” (McAdam / Tarrow / Tilly 2007: 19). Other forms of 
contentious politics such as single event protests do not qualify as social movements, because 
they lack temporal duration or because they are dominated by a rationale of (sustained) 
violence, in which case they would be categorized as civil wars, ethnic or religious conflicts or 
revolutions (Tilly / Tarrow 2006: 8-9).  
The different forms of contentious politics are produced by similar mechanisms that combine 
into particular processes (McAdam / Tarrow / Tilly 2007: 18). These mechanisms can be 
structural (i.e. triggered by structural conditions that will not change in a short time-frame), 
cognitive (which means related to peoples’ perceptions and interpretations) and relational (i.e. 
based in social interactions). Their specific combinations and temporal sequencing leads to 
the different forms of contentious politics. It should be noted that these forms are not fix. Single 
protest events can evolve into social movements and social movements may end up in full-
fledged civil wars. Hence, one of the objectives of the contentious politics approach is to 
identify the mechanisms that cause specific forms of contentious politics and understand why 
they change over time. Moreover, it aims at identifying how specific mechanisms or 
combinations thereof lead to specific social or political outcomes. 
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Tarrow, S. / Tilly, C. (2006): Introduction, in: Ibid, Contentious Politics. Boulder, 
Colorado: Paradigm. 
 
2.4.1. The Emergence of Contentious Politics: A Theory of Mobilization 
In 1965, Mancur Olson formulated his now famous “free rider” problem of collective action 
(contentious politics are collective actions). Based in economic theory, Olson explained that 
rational actors tend to not participate in collective actions that may lead to some common 
benefit or the realization of common interests, since they will prefer to free-ride and expect 
others to do the work. Olson´s solution to this problem was to focus on the selective incentives 
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for those that actively participate. Hence, selective incentives explain collective action. 
Departing from this insight, back in the 1970s social movement researchers concluded that 
interests or, negatively termed, grievances or problems alone will never be a sufficient 
condition to incite collective action or contention (“grievances are everywhere, movements 
not”, Japp 1984: 316).  
Consequently, the emergence of contentious politics must be explained by a theory of 
mobilization. In a very rough summary, the perspective holds that contention emerges when 
three mechanisms are triggered (McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow / Tilly 2006): First, actors 
(termed challengers in the frameworks’ terminology) must attribute opportunity or threat to a 
specific situation. This in turn can spur processes of social appropriation understood as the 
whole range of activities realized to command resources needed to mobilize support, further 
resources and sustain action in order to press for claims (over time). This includes the creation 
or activation of mobilization structures or organizations, alliance-building with other actors in 
order to increase strength as well as the construction and diffusion of credibly collective action 
frames that motivate people to participate in contention (see also next sessions).  
Once completed, these processes of social appropriation may lead to contentious action that 
implies the use of different protest repertoires. These actions, in turn may result in heightened 
interaction between challengers (mobilized people) and their counterparts. It is important to 
note that different actors can be involved in contentious politics, beneath state authorities and 
the actual challengers. The latter may be supported by external actors such as NGOs or 
foundations, while their opponents may be companies or other private actors or counter-
movements (and not the state directly, although it is involved as an object or party to the 
claims). When collective action elicits reactions by other actors (mostly authorities) contention 
can feed on itself: Interactions shape further perceptions of opportunities and threat and in 
doing so may spur next rounds of struggle. They can also strengthen or weaken organizations 
or alliances and modify strategies, tactics or contentious framings. 
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• McAdam, D. / Tarrow, S. / Tilly, C. (2007): Comparative Perspectives on Contentious 
Politics. In: Lichbach, M. / Zuckerman, A. (Eds.): Comparative Politics: Rationality, 
Culture, and Structure: Advancing Theory in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: 




2.4.2. Opportunities and Threats 
Processes of mobilization result from the perception of opportunities and/or threat which are 
defined as "concrete options, chances, and risks that directly inform mobilizing decisions" 
(Koopmans 1999: 104) that lead to different cost-benefit calculations with regard to protest 
mobilization. As to opportunities, actors perceive that the time is right to act (because of some 
sort of signal). Regarding threat, actors perceive that in the absence of collective action the 
chances for realizing their interests will lower significantly. In this sense, social mobilization 
can be opportunity induced or threat induced (Almeida 2003). However, it is important to note 
that neither opportunities nor threat are objective factors. They never exist per se, but must 
always first be interpreted and perceived by actors. 
Research has focused on political opportunities or threats defined as “signals sent from the 
political system” (Meyer 2004) as the main trigger for social mobilization. They can be divided 
into two types. First, they result from reactions from state actors to protest actors and, 
secondly, from relations between protest groups and political elites and third parties (Schock 
2005: 30). States generally have four options for responding to protest groups: they can ignore 
it, appease it (conciliate), grant required reforms or suppress it violently (repress) (Ibid: 31). As 
far as the second type of opportunity is concerned, empirical research has demonstrated a 
robust positive relationship between alliances of challengers with factions of the political elite 
and successful protest mobilizations. As a rule, intra-elitist conflicts (elite-split) precede such 
alliances. Alliances with elite groups increase the chances of success for mobilizations and 
may increase the resource base and legitimacy of protest actors, which in turn lowers the cost 
of collective action. The same applies to the support of third parties. 
Ideally, political opportunities arise via two paths: In a top-down variant, as mentioned above, 
when elites are divided among themselves and a fraction seeks to strengthen its own position 
of power over rival elite groups, it directly or indirectly supports protest movements. In addition, 
by approaching social organizations and movements, elites can identify themselves as 
"tribunes of the people" (Tarrow) and thereby gain a greater support base. On the other hand, 
the mobilized actors are sometimes able to reveal or bring about cracks in the regime (or elite 
splits) and open up new opportunities for themselves and/or other challengers. 
However, not all opportunities are political in nature. Research has shown that also cultural 
(Hollands / Vail 2012), discursive (Koopmans / Statham 1999) or legal opportunities (Wilson / 
Rodriguez 2006) may motivate social mobilizations. The logic operating behind these other 
forms of opportunities is the same as in the case of political opportunities: they signal to 




Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Meyer, D. (2004): Protest and Political Opportunities. Annual Review of Sociology, 30, 
125-145. 
 
2.4.3.  Mobilization Contexts, Alliances and ‘Scale Shift’ 
Opportunities (political and others) play an important role for processes of social mobilization, 
but in themselves are not sufficient to explain their origin (McAdam et al 1988: 709). Before 
they can carry out protest actions, collective actors must first organize themselves. However, 
it is important to note that social organizations and social movements are not the same. 
Organizations may be the bearer of social movements, but they are not the movement itself 
(defined as “sustained challenge to authorities”, see before).  
On the other hand, while many social movements are based on professional social movement 
organizations (SMO; McCarthy / Zald 1977), many others are rooted in informal organizations 
and networks, which were not created specifically with the aim of social mobilization (Tilly 1978: 
54; McAdam et al 1988: 710). Indeed, “mobilization structures” understood as "collective 
vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective 
action" (McAdam et al 1996: 3) can be very diverse: from family and friendly contexts, through 
voluntary associations such as church congregations or associations, to individual work 
departments within companies (McCarthy 1996: 141). These social contexts are particularly 
suitable for mobilization processes because "networks are powerful shapers of behavior" 
(Snow / McAdam 2000: 63). People who belong to the same group are usually bound together 
(admittedly to varying degrees) by a shared collective identity, and therefore interact (more or 
less) in solidarity. In such contexts, group-compatible behavior is rewarded with social esteem 
and recognition by others (i.e. incentives for participation exist). Conversely, the prevailing 
social pressure also increases the individual's cost of not participating in collective action 
(Friedman / McAdam 1992: 163). In addition, the foreseeable response of the collective raises 
the individual's expectations for success and thus their willingness to mobilize (critical mass 
effect) (Klandermans 1997; Kurzman 1996). In addition, empirical studies have shown that 
group solidarity (or even social pressure) acts as a mobilizing factor, especially in situations of 
violence against collective challengers (Brockett 1995). Moreover, micro-mobilization contexts 
have at least a rudimentary organizational infrastructure on which mobilization efforts can 
build. In particular, they often provide the resources needed to establish a social movement or 
protest in the early stages of development: financial and material resources, as well as the 
time and work of its members (McCarthy / Zald 1977). Later on, resources may come from 
other sources (such as foundations or even public agencies) which can have important effects 
on movement´s strategies and tactics. The “resource mobilization theory” has debated these 
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issues extensively (McCarthy / Zald 1977). Hence, these mechanisms allow for the 
mobilization of resources as well as the mobilization of consent and of action (Klandermans 
1997).  
Not all micro-mobilization are equally effective. Rather, the mobilization potential of a group 
depends on its specific characteristics: the higher the internal cohesion (and thus the more 
pronounced the collective identity) and the closer the interpersonal relationships between the 
group members, the higher is the mobilization potential of a collective (Tilly 1978: 63). In this 
respect, the recruitment en bloc of cohesive social groups has proven to be one of the most 
effective mobilization strategies (Oberschall 1973: 125). Moreover, research has that alliances 
among different groups allow for a massive mobilization. So, autonomous organizations rooted 
in local contexts, organized in a single umbrella organization and coordinated by a formal body, 
are the most favorable settings for mobilization processes (Schock 2005: 29). In such cases, 
"mesomobilization" can take place, i.e. the simultaneous activation of all members of the 
organization by the governing body, which ensures a massive participation in the planned 
collective actions (Gerhards / Rucht 1992). Alliances between such umbrella organizations are 
even more effective. To establish such alliances based in common interests, often a 
"brokering" takes place, i.e. the intervention of a third party that connects so far unconnected 
sites (McAdam et al 2001: 26). Alliances can also lead to a ‘scale shift’ defined as “a change 
in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions leading to broader contention 
involving a wider range of actors and bridging claims and identities” (McAdam et al. 2001: 331). 
Scale shifts may extend contentious politics from the local to the national or global levels. 
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Gerhards, J. / Rucht, D. (1992): Mesomobilization: Organizing and Framing in two 
Protest Campaigns in West Germany. The American Journal of Sociology, 98, 555-
596. 
 
2.4.4. Frames: Collectively Shared Meanings and Identities 
From a cultural perspective, social movements and contentious actors in general are 
"meaning-producing agents" who consciously assign meaning to situations and phenomena. 
With the aim of mobilizing support and motivating and encouraging protests, they participate 
in the social struggles over hegemonic interpretations "(...) that is the struggle to have certain 
meanings and understandings gain ascendance over others, or at least move up some existing 
hierarchy of credibility" (Oliver / Snow 1995: 587). 
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This constructivist dimension of social movements is addressed by the framing approach 
(Snow et al. 1986; Snow / Benford 1988, 1992; Snow 2004). The verb framing denotes the 
process of “assigning meaning to and interpret relevant events and conditions in ways that are 
intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support and to 
demobilize antagonists” (Snow / Benford 1988: 198). The results of this framing are 
interpretation schemes or frames of collective action that guide movement participants in their 
actions and in their thinking.  
The framing approach claims a connection between the content and structure of frames and 
successful protest mobilizations: the emergence of social movements depends not only on 
favorable structural or organizational conditions or opportunities but also on the way in which 
mobilizers voice their concerns (Snow / Benford 1992: 144). 
Two conditions are necessary in order to make frames resonant (i.e. successful in terms of 
social mobilization): a coherent internal structure and its ability to connect to the external 
context (Snow / Benford 1988). As far as the internal structure is concerned, a collective action 
frame has to combine three sub-frames: diagnostic framing (which defines the problem and 
the persons or groups responsible for it), prognostic framing (which provides a solution and 
strategy and tactics for achieving it) and motivational framing (which explains why people 
should participate). In summary, the first two sub-frameworks serve the purpose of "consensus 
mobilization". Their goal is to convince potential supporters of the seriousness of the condition 
and the possibilities of its rectification. The motivational frame, on the other hand, is for "action 
mobilization", the conviction for actual participation in protest activities, "moving people from 
the balcony to the barricades" (Benford / Snow 2000: 615). 
In order to be successful, frames must also fit into the respective cultural context: they must 
be "culturally resonant" (McAdam 1994: 45, Snow 2004: 385). They also must be compatible 
with the life worlds of the individuals onto which the mobilization efforts are directed, i.e. they 
must be empirically credible.  
Different from specific collective action frames are so-called master frames, which, while 
performing the same functions, work on a larger scale. Master frames represent new or 
transformed general interpretive patterns that can be adopted by different actors. They function 
as a group integration mechanism. The more open and flexible a master frame is, the more 
protest groups can adopt it (Snow / Benford 1992: 140-141; Gerhard / Rucht 1992: 580). 
Collective actors in contentious politics tend to share a collective identity. Moreover, mobilizers 
actively promote collective identity because it ensures internal unity and solidarity, commitment 
and it constructs a cohesive collective actor for outside actors. A strong collective identity may 
lead to individual cost / benefit calculations in favor of group solidarity, thus effectively 
addressing Olson's "free rider problem" (Tarrow 1998: 16). Thus, collective identities represent 
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an important mobilization resource for mobilizers (Snow / McAdam 2000: 47). As a result, part 
of the mobilizing framing work of movement actors is always identity work (Hunt et al 1994: 
185). This identity work entails emphasizing the qualities of the own group, while the opposing 
side is provided with features that delegitimize their concerns and actions. However, collective 
identities are not just the product of strategic processes. Collective actions and their 
consequences also shape the self-conception of social movements and contentious actors 
(Melucci 1996). 
To foster collective identities, mobilizers have two options. They can redesign them (for 
example, an identity as an animal rights activist) or they can anchor their mobilization efforts 
in existing collective identities (as it happens with ethnic movements). Research has shown 
that this appropriation of "previously established, highly salient collective identities" (Snow / 
McAdam 2000: 56) strongly enhances social mobilization.  
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Benford, R. / Snow, D. (2000): Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and Assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611-639. 
 
2.4.5. Repertoires of Contention: Sets of Tactics and Strategies 
One of the most salient features of contentious actors, in particular social movements, is their 
public performance and their interaction with power holders. Research has often classified 
these behavioral parts of contentious interaction along dichotomy lines such as violent/non-
violent (Kriesi et al. 1995), legal/illegal, legitimate/illegitimate or conventional-
institutional/unconventional-disruptive (Tarrow 1998). However, empirical research has shown 
that contentious actors use different instruments from all of these categories (Tilly 2008). The 
actual instruments actors choose are shaped by the respective cultural, social or political 
context. In this sense, Tilly coined the term “repertoires of contention” referring to the “whole 
set of means [a group] has for making claims of different types on different individuals” (Tilly 
2008).  
Moreover, repertoires are rather rigid phenomenon and not prone to sudden change (Tilly 
2006). However, social movement and other contentious actors usually do not choose from 
the entire sets of repertoires which exist in their political environment, but instead apply similar 
tactics which are compatible with their particular movement or organizational culture, that is 
their collective identity, their framing, the social composition of their adherents and so on. This 
means the choice of a specific tactic or instrument is not a mere rational choice but is culturally 
constrained (Tarrow 1998; della Porta / Diani 2006; Wada 2016: 462).  
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In addition, three factors essentially influence the decision processes of contentious actors for 
specific repertoires: First their form of organization, second their collective action frames and 
third the structural power of their adherents. McAdam and Tilly (et al. 2001) add two macro-
historical factors, for example the development of new technologies or the change of political 
systems. 
This does not mean that collective actors do never use or invent contentious instruments. 
History provides a wide array of examples of actors introducing new protest tactics into their 
repertoire such as sit-ins during the US Civil Rights movement or protest camps as in the case 
of the recent transnational Occupy-Movement. The interesting question then is: when do actors 
innovate? So far transnational spill over and political or legal changes (which may allow for 
new forms of collective action such as street manifestations) as well as cultural changes have 
been found to be influential in this sense. On the other hand, there is also a relation between 
certain instruments and state behavior in particular and outcomes in general (violent means 
may keep governments from consenting to reform). 
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Taylor, V. / Van Dyke, N. (2004): „Get up, Stand up“: Tactical Repertoires of Social 
Movements. In: Snow, D. / Soule, S. / Kriesi, H. (Eds.): The Blackwell Companion to 
Social Movements. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 262-293. 
 
2.4.6. Structures: What Shapes Contention? 
Contentious interaction does not take place in a vacuum, but is shaped by several structural 
factors (structural in the sense that they are not easily alterable). These structural forces 
include the cultural fundament (Williams 2004), economic conditions (McAdam / Schaffer 
Boudet 2012) and the political opportunity structure (POS) i.e. the political system (Kriesi 2004; 
Meyer 2004).  
The concept of ‘political opportunity structure’ refers to the influence of the political system with 
its particular institutional characteristics on contentious interaction (Kriesi 2004; Meyer 2004; 
Koopmans / Kriesi 1995). For instance, (relatively) closed systems that provide little or no 
channels for political participation of citizens tend to have more intense public protests (and 
potentially violent) as (relatively) open systems that make direct civil participation institutionally 
available (Ibid; see also Eisinger 1973). The classical examples are France - a closed polity 
that tends to short and explosive public protests - and Switzerland - an open system with much 
lesser extra-institutional protests.  
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Another concept elaborated to establish the influence of structural conditions on collective 
contention is that of ‘cultural context’ (Williams 2004). The term refers to the socially available 
array of symbols and meanings that shape contentious action (including contentious 
repertoires, see before). Although cultural content may change and social 
movements/contentious actors must actually work towards this end, all sorts of contention 
emerge in a context of given dominant meanings. In this sense, culture has a structural 
dimension that acts, analogously, as a ‘cultural opportunity structure’ (Koopmans 1999).  
Recently, McAdam and Boudet (2012) provided the study of structural determinants of 
contention with new impetus. In order to explain variation in contentious opposition against 
energy-projects in the US, they introduced a range of meso-level. Their first concept is termed 
“community context” and refers to “variables that are powerfully shaping the subjective 
interpretations of the project” and therefore decidedly influence perceptions of opportunities 
and constraints for local struggles (Ibid: 102). In combining economic with cultural factors they 
found that the dependence of any given place on an industry as well as economic hardship act 
as powerful preventers of local opposition. In case of ‘company towns’ that depend 
economically on specific industries, local people are inured to the risks posed by polluting 
industries. As a result, mobilization efforts (if executed) will mostly fall on deaf ears even if 
pollution is severely threatening public health and well-being. In the light of economic hardship, 
the same logic operates: Local people may perceive the project as a benefit and consequently 
not mobilize against - notwithstanding negative environmental or other consequences.  
With regard to cultural features, McAdam and Boudet show that prior experience with political 
struggles ideally with a similar contend spur the emergence of contention. Communities with 
experience in mobilization against prior projects or prior political struggles in general are more 
likely to mobilize opposition than communities without histories of contention (Ibid: 51-52). 
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• McAdam, D. / Schaffer Boudet, H. (2012): Putting Social Movements in their Place. 
Explaining Opposition to Energy Projects in the United States, 2000–2005. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1-27. 
• Kriesi, H. (2004): Political Context and Opportunity, in: Soule, S. et al. (Eds.). The 




2.4.7.  Outcomes of Contentious Politics 
Identifying or measuring outcomes of contentious politics entails a series of methodological, 
theoretical and empirical problems (Giugni et al. 1999; Amenta / Young 1999; Andrews 1997, 
2001; Cress / Snow 2000; Kolb 2007). The main difficulty lies in proving causality between 
observed changes and collective action (Giugni 1998: 373). Was it really collective action or 
the social movement that brought the change about? 
Moreover collective actions can have different outcomes which can take different forms and 
which can be intended and unintended (Andrews 2001: 72; Kolb 2007: 22). 
Most social movements or other contentious actors articulate political claims more or less 
directly and strive towards their realization (Andrews 2001: 72). Hence, one possible 
consequence of movements' activities are political outcomes, understood as intended and 
unintended reactions of the political system (Kolb 2007: 22).  
The implementation of binding political decisions is preceded by sophisticated decision-making 
processes which involve different phases and actors. Following the influential work of John 
Kingdon (1984), the political process can be divided into four sub-processes: agenda-setting, 
development of policy-alternatives (content-specifying), decision-making of specific policies 
and policy implementation. Based on this “phase heuristic” Kolb (2007) developed a typology 
of political effects of social movements that identifies five different types: A social movement 
can claim agenda impact, if it is able to put a specific issue on the political agenda. If a social 
movement is able to influence the content of political proposals, it has an “alternative impact”. 
“Policy impact” is reached if binding laws are implemented which originated in proposals by 
social movements. “Implementation impact” takes place when policies or resolutions are 
stopped, decelerated or accelerated. Lastly, “goods impact” can be stated if public or collective 
goods are indeed provided. In addition to this typology, Kolb distinguishes policy change from 
institutional political change, which in turn can be differentiated in three types (Kolb 2007: 32-
35): Processual change, which provides the social movement with greater participation within 
public institutions; intra-institutional change, which means shifts within the structures or 
mandates of political sub institutions; state transformations, that is variations within the basic 
structures of a political system. 
Empirical research has shown that social movements are often involved in the process of 
agenda setting and achieve implementation impact. The process of content-specifying usually 
takes place behind closed doors and is carried out mostly by technocratic actors. 
However, political outcomes are not the only possible consequences of contentious politics. 
The literature has also found important cultural or biographic consequences of contentious 
politics (Giugni et al. 1999). A cultural outcome is given when contentious actors manage to 
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transform or add meaning (such as that environmental protection is important). Biographic 
consequences refers to the fact that people participating in contentious interactions acquire 
experiences that may shape the course of their lives significantly (they may obtain a leadership 
position in certain organizations or they may be enabled to initiate a formal political career). 
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Giugni, M. (1999): How Social Movements Matter: Past Research, Present Problems, 
Future Developments. In: Giugni, M. / McAdam, D. / Tilly, C. / Tarrow S. (Eds.): How 





B. Contested Extractivism in Latin America 
1. Context and Types 
1.1 The Rise of Extractivism in Latin America and its Consequences 
Several global, regional and national, political and technological transformations have caused 
an increase in extractive industries in Latin America (Bebbington 2012): First, new regulations, 
particularly environmental protection, as well as declining resource reserves in North America 
and Europe have put the global South, and especially South America, into the focus of 
transnational companies investing in the sector (Bridge 2004). On the national level, following 
the neoliberal adjustment programs promoted by international organizations such as the World 
Bank in the 1980s, Latin American governments opened their markets for private investors and 
implemented a series of (mainly fiscal) incentives in order to attract foreign investment. 
Moreover, the sector was widely deregulated. On the other hand, technological innovations 
helped detect new reserves and made the exploitation of previously unprofitable assets 
lucrative. Lastly, the global demand for natural resources (mainly minerals, oil and gas) 
increased significantly mostly driven by the emerging economies of China and India. Combined 
with the subsequently increasing global prices for minerals and gas, the extractive sector in 
Latin America – deregulated and with huge potential reserves – went into a boom. 
While many Latin American economies (in particular the Andean ones) have been dependent 
on their natural resource sectors since their independence from Spain, the recent boom cycle 
in the sector brought an innovation. Starting in the late 1990s all over South America “leftist”, 
“progressive” or so called “post-neoliberal” leaders were elected into power (Hugo Chávez in 
Venezuela (1998), Néstor Kirchner in Argentina (2003), Ignácio ”Lula” de Silva in Brazil (2003), 
Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006) and Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2007). They promoted extractive 
industries as a development strategy, significantly promoted them and invested parts of the 
profits from the sector into social programs destined for poverty alleviation. Hence, 
“extractivism” can be defined as a national, growth-orientated development pathway based on 
rent-seeking activities, that is, the large-scale exploitation, production and exportation of raw 
materials (Burchardt / Dietz 2014). This includes the “expansion of frontiers to territories 
formerly considered ‘unproductive’” (Svampa 2013: 119). The term “neo-extractivism” has 
been coined in order to grasp the new dimension of Latin American extractive politics which 
combines a stronger public control over the sector (for instance through the increase of 
royalties and taxes and the nationalization of companies) and the investment of profits into 
public programs destined at supporting vulnerable groups.  
However, the benefits stemming from this particular development strategy are unequally 
distributed – and so are the costs. While governments shared the increase in public income, 
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especially the localities where extraction takes place (mining sites, etc.) suffer from the many 
negative consequences of extractive projects in their territory. These include environmental 
degradation such as the pollution of water resources and land (because of oil splits or the use 
of toxic agents in mining), competition over local resources (also mainly land and water), social 
fragmentation and forced displacements. As a consequence, social conflicts over extractivism 
particularly in the communities where the projects are located (or are supposed to be located) 
have increased (in Latin America and beyond). All over the continent, these conflicts reveal a 
huge variation regarding the claims involved and the chosen tactics and strategies. Moreover, 
while many remain locally confined, some conflicts obtained national and transnational 
attention (such as the conflicts over the Conga or the Tambogrande mine in Peru, the conflict 
over a planned mine in Esquel, Argentina or the conflict over the Pascua Lama mine in Chile). 
Moreover, many of these social struggles are more than mere struggles over the use and 
distribution of a material resource (such as land, minerals, forest plants, water): they also 
reflect conflicts over political order, competing views of the world and representations of nature, 
incompatible ideas of territory and sovereignty, divergent economic development discourses, 
as well as various claims for justice, social participation and cultural recognition (Bebbington 
et al. 2008a; Dietz / Engels 2017). 
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Bebbington, A. / Bury, J. (2013): Political Ecologies of the Subsoil. In: Ibid (Eds.): 
Subterranean Struggles. New Dynamics of Mining, Oil, and Gas in Latin America. 
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1-16. 
• Hoogenboom, B. (2012): Depoliticized and Repoliticized Minerals in Latin America. 
Journal of Developing Societies, 28 (2), 133-158. 
 
1.2 Types of Contention over Extractivism 
Although a general increase in contention over extractivism can be stated, not all conflicts 
follow the same pattern. Rather, different types regarding the interests involved can be 
observed. Building on the typology of Javier Arellano-Yanguas (2011: 212), at least three 
different forms of contention over extractivism prompted by different causes can be identified: 
The first general type takes place on the local level and pits the local population against 
companies and state authorities over the control of local resources. It can be subdivided in ‘all 
or nothing conflicts’ in which local populations resist the implementation of new operations or 
the expansion of operational mines and in ‘more routine conflicts’ in which local populations 
use contentious tactics not to oppose the project altogether but to negotiate with the company. 
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In this case, conflict is used in order to enhance the local bargaining position for winning 
economic or social benefits.  
The second type does not arise from the extractive industry itself but from increased revenues 
stemming from the sector. Local political actors and administrative jurisdictions fight over the 
access to and use of revenues transferred from the central government to subnational units. 
Arellano-Yanguas found that the great majority of social conflicts over mining that started in 
Peru since 2008 were disputes over the distribution of revenues and not environmentally 
inspired ‘all or nothing’ conflicts (see also Damonte 2008, 2012). Bolivia and the department 
of Tarija provide another example where the national and the regional governments started a 
conflict over the distribution of resources rents: In 2008 a conflict arose between the national 
and the regional governments over the control of the revenues from the gas sector 
(Humphreys-Bebbington / Bebbington 2010). When the national government declared its 
intention to change the system of revenue allocation to foster a more equal system, the 
regional elite mobilized the population stressing the role of gas to maintain and foster identity-
based regional development (Ibid: 143). A third type involves conflicts among local groups over 
the support or rejection of extractive projects. For instance, Humphreys-Bebbington (2012) 
analyzes how the Bolivian public gas and oil company caused serious conflicts among 
Weenhayek communities in the southeastern department of Tarija. The distribution of 
corporate resources incited competition among communities and particularly motivated 
leadership struggles that severely weakened Weenhayek organizations. Pellegrini and Rivera 
(2012) found a similar situation in Northern Bolivia where oil exploration took place. Further 
cases are provided by Schilling-Vacaflor (2014) on Guarani communities in Southern Bolivia, 
by Damonte (2008) on Bolivian and Peruvian peasant communities, by San Juan Stauden on 
the Pascua Lama conflict in Chile (2014) and by Carruthers and Rodriguez (2009) on Mapuche 
communities.  
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Arellano Yanguas, J. (2011): Aggravating the Resource Curse: Decentralization, 





C. Understanding Conflicts over Extractivism through the Lenses 
of CP 
1. Emergence of Social Contention over Extractivism 
Different types of contention over extractivism have emerged during the past boom cycle. What 
causes these different types? As advanced by CP, several studies reveal that attributions of 
opportunity and threat are crucial. For instance, Arellano-Yanguas (2011: 630) argues that ‘all-
or-nothing’ conflicts erupt when local populations perceive threats to their livelihoods. The 
same is supported by studies on Tambogrande (Floysand / Haarstad 2007) and the conflict 
over mining in Cotacachi, Ecuador (Bebbington et al. 2008b). In their most recent statistical 
analysis on the determinants of social conflict over mining in Latin America – so far the only 
large-N analysis in the area - Haslam and Tanimoune (2016: 401) support this idea but 
emphasize that it is perceived competition over scarce resources that motivates company-
community ‘all or nothing’ conflicts.  
Other cases suggest that the initiation of contention over extraction depends on activists’ 
mobilization capacities, particularly their ability to foster a credible discourse that stresses 
potential local economic alternatives. For example, in Esquel, Argentina it was the perception 
that ‘another livelihood is possible’ that drove contention and not its actual existence: When 
the population of Esquel started to mobilize against the gold mine, the region was immersed 
in a sharp economic crisis which had led to the decline of many alternative economic branches. 
Because the mobilizers constantly emphasized the importance of alternative livelihoods, 
people in the local community did not believe the company´s and state´s discourse about 
mining as the only motor for economic development in the region (Walter / Martínez-Alier 
2010). Likewise, the anti-mining movement in Cotacachi actively fostered non-mining 
livelihoods (such as ecotourism and organic coffee production) as a way to lend legitimacy to 
its discourse and secure its bargaining power vis-à-vis the company and the state (Bebbington 
et al. 2008b: 2899). Moreover, almost all conflicts over extraction were sparked by 
intransparent corporate and government behavior and the lack of mechanisms of social 
participation that created a perception of collusion and threat and in turn motivated social 
mobilization. 
In contrast, when economic alternatives are lacking or when communities perceive that they 
will not obtain a proper share of a companies’ profits, negotiations over benefits from the 
company have been found to be more likely to occur (Arellano Yanguas 2011; Damonte 2012). 
In these cases, the establishment of the extractive industry is perceived as an opportunity and 
conflict is initiated in order to increase community benefits. Moreover, only cohesive opposition 
fronts are able to fight ‘all or nothing’ conflicts (Bebbington et al. 2008b). In cases where there 
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are divergent local interests, negotiations for compensation and economic benefits are the 
more likely outcome.  
Certainly, the types of contention frequently do combine and intersect. Moreover, as Arellano-
Yanguas (2012) puts it, actors may not agree on the nature of a conflict and types may change 
in time. For example, fragmented local actor constellations can also be fabricated in the course 
of conflict and do not necessarily need to be present at the outset of conflict.. Companies or 
authorities may provide selective incentives (money or other material benefits) in order to split 
(potential) opposition. As a consequence, ‘all or nothing’ conflicts may be transformed into 
negotiations conflicts among groups as was the case in the conflict over Pascua Lama, Chile 
(Urkidi 2010: 224) or over the Yanacocha mine in Cajamarca, Peru (Bebbington et al. 2008b: 
2897). Further research may address the conditions that motivate actors to modify their claims 
or strategies – and thereby changing the type of contention – or also the role of other actors 
like companies and states in transforming types of conflict. 
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Bebbington, A. / Humphreys-Bebbington, D. / Bury, J. / Lingan, J. / Muñoz, J. P. / 
Scurrah, M. (2008): Mining and Social Movements: Struggles Over Livelihood and 
Rural Territorial Development in the Andes. World Development, 36 (12), 2888-2905. 
 
2. Shaping Contention over Extractivism: Local Economies, POS and Culture  
As previously explained local economic conditions can spur contention over extractivism, such 
as when livelihoods alternative to extractive industries exist or resources are scarce. Yet, they 
may also impede it. For instance, a strong local mining tradition can prevent people from joining 
opposition (McAdam / Schaffer Boudet 2012). In such cases, mining (or other extractive 
activities) is perceived as a constitutive part of local life and identity. Moreover, it may be the 
single most important provider for jobs and income (see Gaventa 1980 for an early formulation 
of this argument). Such economic dependency combined with the cultural foundation confronts 
challengers with serious difficulties in mobilizing support for anti-extractive movements, as can 
be seen in current Latin American cases as well: Bebbington et al. (2008b) describe such a 
situation for the case of the Yanacocha Mine in Peru and Widener (2007) for two traditional 
Ecuadorian oil sites. The fact that the Bolivian department and city of Potosí, a mining site 
since the 16th century, as well as many other long-standing mining localities in the Bolivian 
and Chilean Andean highlands have not seen any significant conflict over mining, although 
mining-related grievances are high, also supports this idea (see Preston, 2012 for a similar 
argument). Additionally, states and companies may actively create mining identities via public 
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opinion campaigns, as Antonelli and Svampa (2012) demonstrate for the case of San Juan, 
Argentina.  
Alongside economic factors the political opportunity structure shapes contention over 
extractivism in Latin America. The judicial system has been shown to be of particular 
importance here. For example, in Chile where the number of conflicts over mining and other 
extractive projects is very high, the relative effectiveness of the judicial system encourages 
challengers to take their claims to court. Legal means are widely perceived as effective means. 
Colombia is also an example where challengers, confident about the legal system, have 
increasingly resorted to judicial means (Dietz 2016). The same can be observed for the 
opponents: Authorities and companies in these countries also appeal frequently to courts to 
stop opposition (a tendency referred to as the “judicialization” of conflicts, see Campos Medina 
2012). In Peru, to the contrary, the judicial system is weak and mostly absent. Combined with 
the general institutional weakness, methods used in conflicts over extraction tend to be extra-
institutional (and often violent, see below).  
Moreover, distributional regimes and allocation systems influence the dynamics of contention. 
For instance, it seems that the Peruvian compensation-based model that transfers revenues 
to regional and local entities makes the country particularly prone to local conflicts among 
subnational entities (alongside local-regional divides). Contrarily, direct allocation from the 
central government (as in place in Chile or Ecuador) seems to incite lesser contention, while 
Bolivia´s highly unequal regional distribution system motivates conflicts between regions and 
the national government (see Damonte / Glave 2012). Lastly, in federal systems such as the 
ones in Argentina or Brazil, different subnational opportunity structures can be expected to 
have an impact on dynamics of mobilization and on their outcomes. 
Regarding cultural factors, the studies stress the impact of the local history of conflict. As 
shown for other cases (McAdam / Schaffer Boudet 2012), communities with experience in 
conflict and activism tend to mobilize with more ease than unexperienced communities. In 
these cases, transaction costs are very low: An organizational infrastructure already exists that 
can be activated for contention and people can make use of established contentious 
repertoires. Furthermore, past success motivates people to engage in contention because they 
perceive that winning is possible (Tarrow 1995). Collective memory and the cultural foundation 
apparently also influence the use of violence by challengers which varies greatly within and 
among countries. For instance, Peru has by far the highest rate of local groups making use of 
violent means in conflicts over extractivism (see for example the cases of Yanacocha or Rio 
Majaz or recent clashes in Islay, Arequipa). While Crabtree and Crabtree-Condor (2012) argue 
that state weakness combined with legacies of armed conflicts (such as those in Peru and 
Colombia) cause violence, Taylor (2011), discussing a mining conflict in the Peruvian 
Condebamba valley, is more specific. He found that local violence depended on the respective 
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cultural fundament that informs challengers. In particular, localities where the peasant 
organization rondas campesinas organized contention were significantly less violent than 
others. Established during Peru´s civil war the rondas have a commitment as local peace-
keepers and tend to non-violent conflict resolutions. As a highly hierarchical organization they 
are also able to control and discipline their members (see the next section). Schilling-Vacaflor 
(2014) makes a similar point addressing the relative peacefulness of Guarani communities 
confronting extractivism in their territories. On the other hand, groups with violent legacies and 
histories such as the Mapuche in Southern Chile tend to use violent means more frequently 
(Carruthers / Rodriguez 2009). 
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Preston, D. (2012): Household and Community Responses to Mining-related River 
Contamination in the Upper Pilcomayo Basin, Bolivia. In: Bebbington, A. (Ed.): Social 
Conflict, Economic Development and Extractive Industry. London/New York: 
Routledge, 187-198. 
• Taylor, L. (2011): Environmentalism and Social Protest: The Contemporary Anti-
mining Mobilization in the Province of San Marcos and the Condebamba Valley, Peru. 
Journal of Agrarian Change, 11, 420-439. 
 
3. Contested Extractivism: Organizations and Alliances 
In the course of the last decade, all over Latin America new local organizations have been 
established and existing ones have been converted into powerful vehicles for mobilization 
against extractive industries. Particularly traditional local organizations able to generate social 
cohesion through the imposition of discipline on their members (and with a collective memory 
of conflict and collective action, see previous section) serve as effective vehicles for 
mobilization (such as the rondas campesinas in Peru or indigenous organizations and 
communities in general). 
In several cases, translocal umbrella organizations that unite different social sectors have been 
established. Indeed, successful anti-extraction campaigns such as those in Tambogrande, 
Pascua Lama, Cotacachi or against the Merlin Mine in Guatemala resulted from wide political 
alliances that transcended ethnic or class boundaries (i.e. Floysand / Haarstad 2007; Urkidi 
2010; Rasch 2012). Moreover, support by local authorities (governments or parishes) was 
decisive for successful local resistance (Bebbington et al. 2008b; San Juan Standen 2014). 
Local or regional organizations often extend into the national or global sphere. In recent years 
in almost all Latin American countries national networks against extractivism have been 
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formed. Examples are the Confederación Nacional de Comunidades del Perú Afectadas por 
la Minería (CONACAMI) in Peru, the Frente de Mujeres Defensores de la Pachamama in 
Ecuador, and the Union de Asambleas Ciudadanas in Argentina. Through these networks, 
local groups connect with each other and with potential external supporters such as NGOs 
specialized in environmental conflicts (for instance OLCA in Chile or Grufides in Peru) or 
oppositional political parties and human rights institutions (i.e. in Peru the Socialist Party or the 
National Ombudsman, see Arellano Yanguas (2012) and Bebbington (2012a)). In addition, 
many local or national organizations are inserted into transnational networks that link them 
with NGOs in other parts of the Americas or Europe as well as with international organizations. 
Today a dense global organizational network exists that can provide visibility, legitimacy and 
resources to local challengers and commands large expertise regarding conflicts over 
extractivism. For instance, several global networks monitor and contest activities of major 
companies worldwide and support local groups affected by damaging corporate behavior 
particularly in the case of mining and energy, for instance Mining Watch Canada 
(https://miningwatch.ca/) or Oil Watch (www.oilwatch.org). These transnational advocacy 
networks may cause a ‘boomerang effect’ (Keck / Sikkink 1998) by placing pressure on foreign 
governments which in turn might try to influence governments of the countries where the 
extraction is being realized (or is supposed to take place) and where the conflict emerged (see  
Bebbington 2012b for the Rio Blanco conflict). Transnational activism may furthermore have 
an impact on evaluations of costs and benefits by companies’ shareholders who for their part 
may press corporate management to modify or stop investments (as happened in the case of 
Pascua Lama). 
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Urkidi, L. (2010): A Glocal Environment Movement against Gold Mining: Pascua Lama 
in Chile. Ecological Economics, 70, 219-227. 
• Walter, M. / Martínez-Alier, J. (2010): How to be Heard when Nobody Wants to Listen: 





4. Politics of Scale and the Transnationalization of Conflicts over Extractivism 
Current contention over extractivism in Latin America registers a strong involvement of external 
actors (mainly NGOs or private agencies) who ally with affected local communities. In some 
cases, the conflicts experienced a shift in scale and have come to involve national or 
transnational actors. Empirical studies showed that such alliances among local, national or 
particularly transnational actors can be highly conflictive. At the same time, various studies 
stress the difficulties for coalition-building particularly between indigenous groups and NGOs 
(environmental and others) due to a general distrust or diverging agendas 
(Carruthers/Rodriguez 2009; Pratt 2012; Schilling-Vacaflor 2014). Additionally, the effects of 
transnational campaigns on localities in contention are ambiguous. Some authors have been 
unable to detect any significant influence in their cases (Bebbington et al. 2008 b), some have 
found transnational alliances empowering local challengers (i.a. Fløysand / Haarstad 2007; 
Urkidi 2010; Buchanan 2013) and others have even identified a harmful impact (Widener 2007; 
Pratt 2012). Regarding the latter, scholars stress two potential pitfalls: The incompatibility of 
local and transnational agendas and the mismatch between local/national conditions and 
transnational strategies. For instance, in his study on opposition to the Camisea gas project in 
untouched parts of the Peruvian Amazonia, Pratt (2012) found that indigenous Machiguenga 
communities faced severe difficulties when trying to balance the support from international 
environmental and conservation NGOs and the local developmental needs of their 
impoverished bases. Since they felt that the project would be implemented regardless of their 
consent, they initiated negotiations with the company over compensations, local development 
measures and proper environmental standards. As a result, relations with the INGOs that 
supported the communities in their conflict with the company became strained and were finally 
suspended.  
Analyzing the transnational campaign against an oil pipeline in Ecuador that involved four 
independent sites (Lago Agrio, Quito, Mindo and Esmeraldas), Widener reached similar 
results: The transnational campaign emphasized environmental conservation at the expense 
of development claims thereby failing to address adequately local needs in at least two of the 
sites involved in the conflict. This mismatch was caused by the differential needs of local and 
international, particularly Northern, stakeholders that supported the campaign. In order to 
match Northern expectations, domestic claims had to be deemphasized and simplified. As a 
consequence, the discourse shifted from one on local environmental justice to one on global 
environmental protectionism, or as Widener (2007: 21) calls it, from local ‘dignity in life’ claims 
to environmental protection claims. The author identifies two further negative effects: The 
environmental protection discourse resonated only with selected groups (‘environmental elites’ 
in Quito and in Mindo) and thereby aggravated local inequalities. Likewise, it potentially 
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undermined domestic network building. Groups that counted on transnational support had no 
incentive to build strong local or national alliances (Ibid: 31).  
Both studies also illustrate the failure of transnational strategies when not taking local 
conditions and power relations into account. Both campaigns targeted the Northern 
headquarters of the respective company and, in the case of Ecuador, international financing 
(mainly the Germany-based bank WestLB). In doing so, they failed to address other prime 
actors: the Ecuadorian and Peruvian governments. Consequently, the projects started as 
planned and the campaigns ended up not providing any meaningful benefits for the affected 
communities. However, while transnational campaigns might have no effects in the localities 
where the conflicts evolve, this does not mean that they have no effects at all: As Rivera (2011) 
shows, transnational campaigns directed at a particular local conflict might fail on the local 
level but nevertheless cause changes on the global level 
Fløysand and Haarstad (2007) take a more differentiated stance in investigating the conditions 
of successful transnational campaigns. Studying the case of Tambogrande, Peru they found 
that the global campaign worked out because challengers managed to strategically adapt the 
narrative of the conflict (i.e. the frame) to hegemonic discourses on both the national and global 
levels. While stressing the protection of local (agricultural) livelihoods at the local level, the 
national campaign emphasized the dangers posed by mining to the production of limes –an 
important ingredient for a nationally significant Peruvian dish (ceviche) and beverage (Pisco 
Sour). The global campaign in turn stressed the protection of human rights and democracy. 
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Fløysand, A. / Haarstad, H. (2007): Globalization and the Power of Rescaled 
Narratives: A Case of Opposition to Mining in Tambogrande, Peru. Political 
Geography, 26, 289-308.  
• Pratt, B. (2012): The Camisea Gas Project: Indigenous Social Movements and 
International NGOs in the Peruvian Amazon. In: Bebbington, A. (Ed.): Social Conflict, 
Economic Development and Extractive Industry. London/New York: Routledge, 172-
186. 
• Widener, P. (2007): Benefits and Burdens of Transnational Campaigns: A Comparison 






5. Contested Extractivism, the State and Companies 
Alongside local actors, state agencies and companies play a key role in current conflicts over 
extractivism. State agencies have been found to actively shape current dynamics of social 
conflicts over extractivism. In some cases they ignored the conflicts, in others they reacted 
with repression (through their “security forces”, the military or police. See for example the cases 
of Conga or Tingo Maria in Peru). In other cases, they established mechanisms of dialogue 
(such as roundtables) or they used prior consultation processes in order to mitigate social 
opposition. It is interesting to note that significant differences exist regarding the ways that 
states address conflicts over extractivism with for instance the Peruvian state tending towards 
repression and the Chilean state tending towards ignoring conflicts over extractivism.  
Taylor and Bonner (2017) adduce the cases of Cajamarca in Peru and Catamarca in Argentina 
to point out how state power, particularly if combined with corporate power, can intimidate and 
repress opposition movements in order to demobilize their adherents and constrain their ability 
to contest extractive industries. Using the examples of peasant movements in Argentina and 
Brazil, Motta (2017) shows how the state not only uses threats and repression but also social 
concessions such as poverty reduction programs as means to demobilize social movements. 
Companies also shape contention in a structural sense as well as with their actions. For 
instance, Bebbington et al. (2008b: 2893) argue that the size and the resourcefulness of a 
company decisively affect the success of mobilizations (aimed at preventing the project). The 
bigger and the richer the company, the less likely it is that local resistance will be successful. 
In turn, small companies increase the probability of success. Generally, they command few 
resources and depend on quick success in order to secure further investment capital. Ongoing 
local opposition may raise their costs to a level no longer profitable for small corporations, as 
happened in the case of Piura, Peru where a minor Chinese company was forced to leave due 
to rising costs induced by contention (Bebbington 2012; see also Walter / Martínez-Alier 2010). 
The same happened in Cotacachi (Bebbington et al. 2008 b). Once again, the quantitative 
study by Haslam and Tanimoune (2016: 416) suggests a somewhat different picture: the 
authors found that mid-tier companies provoke social contention more often because they 
operate mines with large scale effects while retaining the ad hoc community relations of small 
firms. As a result, they are incapable of securing the social license needed to operate (see 
below). 
Moreover, the origin of companies shapes the dynamics and particularly the scale of contention 
(see also Haslam / Tanimoune 2016). For instance, transnational strategies seem most 
probable when transnational companies are involved. There might be one exception to this 
concerning Asian companies increasingly involved in Latin America’s extractive industry: As 
Buchanan (2013) notes, Asian companies and their shareholders tend to be less sensitive 
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about environmental concerns and questions of human rights. This in turn may seriously affect 
local opportunities for opposition including scale-up strategies intended to reach national and 
international support (see also Widener 2007: 32). Likewise, successful resistance seems less 
probable when state-owned companies are involved (Schorr 2018). There may be various 
causes for this: In many Latin American countries, state-owned companies enjoy high 
legitimacy among national publics because they are perceived as guarantors of national 
development and sovereignty. Moreover, they often constitute powerful symbols for successful 
national struggles against vested interests (Valdivia / Perreault 2010). Furthermore, national 
companies seem not to be attractive targets for transnational campaigns since their behavior 
cannot be connected easily to experiences in other parts of the world. Consequently, activists 
face major difficulties in raising support against state-run extractive industries. 
On the other hand, companies do not remain passive in the face of contention. Since their 
foremost aim is to realize their projects, they intervene in order to ‘tame’ contention, i.e. to 
demobilize challengers or to prevent it altogether. Companies try to influence processes of 
social appropriation, perceptions of threat and opportunities and dynamics of interactions in a 
way that grants them the so-called ‘social license’ needed to realize their business interests. 
Companies frame such activities as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) – a 
concept that gained momentum in recent years in companies’ discourses and practices, not 
the least with regard to international shareholders sensitive to issues such as human rights or 
environmental protection (Owen/Kemp 2012). They employ different strategies and 
instruments such as extended public media campaigns and social programs (support for 
hospitals, schools, scholarships, productive projects etc., see Bebbington 2010; Himley 2013) 
to shift public perceptions on mining in general and the company in particular. In several cases, 
companies and authorities tried to exploit existing social divisions and coopted strategic groups 
in order to split (potential) opposition as happened in the case of Pascua Lama (Schorr 2018; 
San Juan Standen 2014). In Lliquimuni, Bolivia the company rewarded peasant groups that 
supported its plans and in communities in Northern Argentina (Göbel 2014) as well as in 
Ecuador (Warnaars 2013), young people were selectively targeted for corporate programs 
pitting them against elders opposed to the project. 
 
Recommended Preparatory Reading: 
• Bebbington, A. (2010): Extractive Industries and Stunted States: Conflict, 
Responsibility and Institutional Change in the Andes. In: Raman, R. (Ed.): Corporate 
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MacMillan, 97-115. 
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la minería en Chile. Estudios Atacameños (forthcoming). 
• Taylor, A. / Bonner, M. (2017): Policing Economic Growth: Mining, Protest, and State 
Discourse in Peru and Argentina. Latin American Research Review, 52 (1), 112–126. 
 
6. So What? Outcomes of Contention over Extractivism 
After more than a decade of widespread and ever increasing contention over extractivism on 
the local, national and transnational levels, so far what are the outcomes? First of all, several 
communities were able to claim victory in their conflicts with corporations and authorities: 
Investments were halted and companies left localities (as was the case in Esquel, Cotacachi, 
Tambogrande, Rio Blanco or Pascua Lama). Moreover, contention over the presence of 
extractive industries led to an increase in local participation, political experience as well as 
organization-building and strengthening that certainly will transcend the current moment 
(Damonte 2008, 2012).  
Resource struggles so far clearly had an impact on state – society relations, especially at the 
local scale. An example thereof is provided by Mariana Walter and Leiri Urikidi (2015) in their 
analysis of popular consultations on mining in Latin America. The authors conclude that 
through social mobilizations against mining and by pressing for popular consultations at the 
local scale, in many places hybrid institutions have emerged that are characterized by new 
state-society interfaces and which are the result of dynamic interactions between non-state 
and state actors, formal and informal spaces of participation. 
However, neither the victories nor increased participation may be long-lasting: In almost all 
cases where extraction was prevented by local mobilizations, governments and (often new) 
companies nevertheless persist in bringing pressure and working towards the realization of the 
projects (for instance in the Ecuadorian Intag Valley or in Esquel). As a consequence, affected 
communities are in a permanent state of emergency that might cause an erosion of the 
willingness to oppose and lead to the general perception that extractivism is inevitable. 
Furthermore, researchers should pay close attention to the specific mechanisms that caused 
extractive projects to stop. What might appear to be a result of local combativeness may well 
turn out to be the product of corporate calculations of costs and benefits dependent upon 
developments on the world market and not upon local circumstances (see also 
McAdam/Schaffer 2012 on this point). 
Regarding the political outcomes, contention over extractivism was successful mainly in the 
first phase of the policy cycle. These conflicts managed to put the subject of (neo-) extractivism 
and its ecological and social problems onto the political agenda (Bebbington 2012b: 215). Yet, 
as the cycle proceeds, with every phase the outcomes seem more modest. Up to now, as the 
ever-rising number of conflicts over extractivism suggests, meaningful public policy regulating 
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the industry and even more so the implementation of regulation remains still a difficult task for 
the future. Indeed, in several countries, environmental and sector regulation does exist but 
suffers severe implementation gaps. The root of this is to be found in the structural conditions 
of ongoing dependence and reliance of many Latin American governments on the extraction 
of raw material and agribusiness (Burchardt / Dietz 2014). Endowed with such a strategic 
importance and backed by the general conviction that it is the best way to develop (what 
Svampa (2013) termed the ‘commodity consensus’), regulations are more often than not 
ignored or twisted. 
On the other hand, it does not mean that nothing has been accomplished at all. As the edited 
volume by Bebbington (2012a) shows, social conflicts over extraction have in some cases 
contributed to policy change: In Peru contention led to new laws on the distribution of revenues 
(Arellano-Yanguas 2012; Damonte 2012) and the increase particularly of violent conflicts 
ultimately motivated the improvement of the regulation of consultation processes (Bebbington 
2012a). In Ecuador, an anti-mining moratorium to halt new mining projects was imposed in 
2008 (Moore / Velásquez 2012). Although it was later lifted, the new mining mandate 
introduced inter alia the concept of “no-go” zones in forest reserves and near rivers and put 
certain restrictions on corporate activities (Kirsch 2012: 204). In Argentina, the federal structure 
of the country allowed for a somewhat different outcome: Following the conflict in Esquel, 7 
out of 23 Argentinean provinces ratified a ‘mining ban’ prohibiting open-pit mining activities in 
their territories (Walter / Martínez-Alier 2010: 296). Yet again, this may not last: Both the 
authorities and companies are working to lift or circumvent the ban. The province of Chubut 
for instance has already modified the law completely. Even when the implementation is 
deficient and restrictions on extractive industries are constantly jeopardized, these 
achievements can lay the ground for further changes. In addition, contention over extractivism 
helped institutions promoting human rights (for instance the National Ombudsman office in 
Peru, see Arellano-Yanguas (2011) and Bebbington (2012a)) and environmental institutions 
as well as NGOs to strengthen their positions in national politics. 
Within the context of contested extractivism and resource struggles, the state has always 
played a pivotal role, both related to the normative and coercive power of state institutions as 
an object of claims, and as an actor in its own right (Bury / Bebbington 2013). However, as 
Verbrugge (2017) and Martín (2017) suggest, conceptualizing the state as a fixed set of 
formal–legal institutions, socio-culturally linked to a national collectivity, fails to capture the 
actual dynamics of state formation. The latter involves a range of public and private, business 
and social actors, which are linked to one another by various formal and informal institutions. 
Other types of outcomes – such cultural and biographical ones – have so far not been treated 
directly by researchers. Both would yield interesting topics for future investigations. 
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